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Abstract
The dominant pattern in U.S. non-alcoholic drink consumption over the past 25 years has 
been a steady increase in per capita soft-drink consumption, largely at the expense o f coffee (and 
to a lesser extent) milk consumption. Our findings suggest that the major factor governing this 
pattern is structural change. Specifically, trend was found to be statistically significant in three o f 
the four equations estimated in the Rotterdam system. Moreover, the estimated trend-related 
changes in per capita consumption (-1.0 percent per year for milk, 2.1 percent for soft drinks, and - 
3.7 percent for coffee and tea) leave at most 28 percent o f the observed quantity variation for 
1990-1994 to be accounted for by changes in relative prices, income, and advertising. Advertising 
effects are statistically significant, but modest. The question o f whether milk advertising is 
profitable when demand interrelationships are taken into account must await additional research.
K ey w ords: advertising, beverage demand, milk consumption, structural change.
Hui Xiao, Henry W . Kinnucan 
and Harry M. Kaiser1
Advertising, Structural Change, and
U.S. Non-Alcoholic Drink Demand
Introduction
Galbraith’s hypothesis “If advertising 
affects the distribution of demand between sellers of 
a particular product, it must also be supposed that 
it affects the distribution between products" 
(Galbraith, p. 205; see also pp. 214-215) assumes 
added significance in the context of non-alcoholic 
beverage advertising. At $ 1.1 billion in 1994 alone 
(Appendix Table 2), this group is one of the most 
heavily advertised in the U.S. economy. Moreover, 
two items in the group -- milk and fruit juices — are 
the target of significant levels of generic advertising 
(over $100 million in 1994) funded by the dairy 
industry and citrus growers. Another $114 million 
now exists for the milk moustache print campaign 
by milk processors (USDA, AMS). Although 
substantial research has been done to determine 
whether generic advertising of milk and fruit juices 
pays (e.g., Ward and Dixon; Blisard el al.; Kaiser 
el al.; Wohlgenant and Clary; Lee and Brown), no 
study has investigated the beverages in an 
integrated framework that takes into account the 
full array of substitution effects.2 For example, a 
successful fluid milk advertising campaign might 
erode the demand and price for citrus products. In 
addition, the decrease in citrus price could lower the
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An exception to this statement is Goddard and Tielu’s 
study of milk advertising in the Ontario market.
milk price through second-round or feedback 
effects. These spillover and feedback effects have 
not been addressed in the milk and citrus 
advertising literatures, which could cause the 
estimated returns to be overstated (Kinnucan, 
1996).
In this paper, we determine whether 
advertising of non-alcoholic beverages has any 
detectable effect on aggregate demand for the 
individual beverages. Owing to the importance of 
demand interrelationships, special attention is given 
to spillover effects, i.e., whether one beverage’s 
advertising affects the demand for related 
beverages. A secondary objective is to test Theil’s 
theory that advertising elasticities are proportional 
to price elasticities. Theil’s proportionality
hypothesis has been maintained in synthetic models 
of advertising effectiveness (Wohlgenant) and in 
econometric estimation (e.g., Duffy 1987, 1990; 
Selvanathan 1989a; Green, Carman and
McManus). As a by-product of our analysis, we 
test whether structural change plays a role in the 
observed consumption pattern, particularly the rise 
in soft-drink consumption between 1970 and 1994 
from 24.3 gallons per person to 52.2 gallons and 
the decline in milk consumption from 31.3 gallons 
per person to 24.7 gallons (Appendix Table 1).
We begin by discussing the model, data, 
and estimation procedures. Hypothesis tests, 
parameter estimates, and elasticities are then 
presented and discussed. The paper concludes with 
a summary of the major findings, including 
implications for the recent expansion in milk 
advertising financed by fluid milk processors.
Model The Rotterdam model was selected because 
it is consistent with demand theory (Theil 1965; 
Barnett); it is as flexible as any other local 
approximating form (Mountain); it lends itself to 
advertising applications (e.g., Brown and Lee 1993; 
Duffy 1987, 1990); and prior testing indicated that 
the estimated advertising effects from the 
Rotterdam model were similar to those obtained 
from its major rival, the (linear approxinmate) 
Almost Ideal Demand System, and from a double­
log specification (Xiao).
Several approaches can be used to augment 
the Rotterdam specification to include advertising 
effects. The most common approach, suggested by 
Theil (1980), is to view advertising as a "taste 
shifter" that affects marginal utility. In this 
formulation, advertising enters the model as a price 
deflator (e.g., Duffy 1987; Brown and Lee 1993). 
An alternative approach, advocated by Stigler and 
Becker, is to view advertising (or other information 
sources) as an input in the household production 
function. In this formulation, advertising enters the 
(derived) demand function for market goods as a 
separate shift variable along with prices and income 
(e g., Kinnucan, Xiao, Hsia, and Jackson).
Testing the simple-shift specification 
against the taste-shift specification using citrus 
data, Brown and Lee (1993) found them to be 
statistically equivalent. Accordingly, in this study 
both forms of the Rotterdam model are estimated to 
determine the sensitivity of parameter estimates to 
model specification. The four-equation system 
consists of demand equations for fluid milk, fruit 
juices (chiefly orange and apple), soft drinks, and 
coffee and tea. Thus, weak separability of the non­
alcoholic drink group is treated as a maintained 
hypothesis and total group expenditure is used in 
place of income in the absolute-price form of the 
Rotterdam model.3
Demographics have been shown to be a 
significant determinant of milk consumption (W ard 
and Dixon; Blisard et al.). To incorporate 
demographics into demand systems in a way that 
preserves the adding-up condition, Poliak and 
Wales advocate the technique of scaling and 
translating. With translating, the demographic 
variables are assumed to affect demand through the 
income term; with scaling, demographic variables 
influence demand through the price terms. In a 
preliminary analysis, we tested the scaling and 
translating approaches against an alternative model 
in which the demographic variables (age and food- 
away-from-home expenditures) enter as simple shift 
variables. Results indicated a superior fit for the
3 For a clear discussion of the distinction between the 
absolute- and relative-price versions of the Rotterdam model in an 
advertising context, see Selvanathan (1989b).
simple-shift specification, the approach taken here.4 
As noted by Piggott et al. (1996, p. 270, note 6), 
adding-up is preserved in the simple-shift 
specification by requiring the coefficients of the 
demographic variables to sum to zero across 
equations.
Because quarterly data were not available 
on a national basis for any of the beverages except 
milk, the model is specified in annual form. 
Although an annual model may produce upward­
-biased estimates of advertising responses (Clarke, 
1976), it has the advantage that lag structures need 
not be specified. Clarke (1976) finds that the 
advertising carryover period for mature, frequently- 
purchased, low-priced items is generally nine 
months or less. Tomek and Cochrane suggested 
that long-run demand equations for food items 
encompass a period of one year or less, an 
hypothesis that is consistent with the beverage 
demand literature (e.g., Ward and Dixon; Brown 
and Lee, 1993).
The basic specification is:
Model A:
(1) w„ din q„ = a{ + b, din Q, + £ /  cy din pJt 
+ Zi dy din AJt + e, din AGEt + f  din FAFH, + v„ 
Model B:
(2) w„ din qn = a / + b, 'din Q,+ £ /  cy ' (din 
pjt - Yj din A jt) + e , 'din AGE, + f, 'din FAFH, +
Vff'
where Model A corresponds to the simple-shift 
specification suggested by Stigler and Becker’s 
analysis and Model B corresponds to Theil’s taste- 
shift specification. In Theil’s (1980) original 
specification, the Yj parameters in Model B are 
identical for all j. Following Duffy (1987, p.
4Owing to degrees-of-freedom problems, the scaling and 
translating tests were restricted to the taste-shift version of the Rotterdam 
model. For details, see Xiao.
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1053), we have left y free to vary between goods to 
test for differing degrees of effectiveness among the 
campaigns.
In these models, z indexes the equation (z = 
1, 2, 3, 4 for milk, juices, soft drinks, and coffee 
and tea, respectively) and t indexes the time period 
(t = 2,3,...,25 for 1971 to 1994). The term dlnQt = 
wit din qu is the Divisia volume index, which can 
be interpreted as a third-order approximation to real 
expenditure on the beverage group (Goldberger, p. 
95). The coefficient, wit, corresponds to the 
expenditure share of beverage item z in year t, qit 
denotes per capita consumption of beverage item z 
in year t, pJt is the nominal price of beverage item 
j  in year z, AJt is the real per capita advertising 
expenditure on beverage item j  in year t, AGEt is 
the proportion of the U.S. population less than age 
five in year t, FAFH, is the ratio of food-away- 
from-home expenditures to food-at-home
expenditures in year t, and v„ and v,/ are random 
error terms. An intercept is included in equations 
(1) and (2) to test for non-specific structural 
change.
An implicit assumption underlying 
equations (1) and (2) is that brand and generic 
advertising have identical effects on aggregate 
demand. This assumption does not affect soft drinks 
or coffee and tea, as advertising for these beverages 
is strictly brand. Nor does it affect milk, since the 
milk advertising data used in this study are strictly 
generic. For juices, the data contain significant 
amounts of both types of advertising as there are 
both strong brands (e.g., SunKist; Citrus Hill) and 
active support of generic advertising by citrus 
growers. To the extent that brand advertising 
merely shifts market share with no effect on 
aggregate demand, combining brand advertising 
with generic would tend to bias the own-advertising 
coefficient for juices toward zero. However, 
empirical results for a wide range of products 
suggest that brand advertising does more than shift 
market share (Duffy 1987, 1990; Brester and 
Schroeder; Kaiser and Liu).
Price symmetry and price homogeneity are 
tested in equation (1) by imposing, respectively, the 
restrictions cy = cp for all z and j  and ci} = 0 for 
all z. Similar restrictions apply to equation (2), i.e.,
price symmetry implies cl} '= cp 'for all z and j  and 
price homogeneity implies ^  ctJ ' = 0 for all z .
Advertising symmetry and advertising 
homogeneity (e.g., see Selvanathan 1989b) are 
tested, respectively, by imposing dy = dJt for all z 
and j  and dtJ = 0 for all z in Model A.5 For 
Theil’s specification (Model B), advertising 
symmetry is tested jointly with price symmetry, as 
advertising effects are assumed to be proportional 
to price effects.
Engel aggregation requires that b, = 1. 
Based on the proposition that an advertising- 
induced increase in the demand for one commodity 
must be offset by a decrease in the demand for at 
least one other commodity if the budget constraint 
is to be satisfied, Basmann (p. 53) developed an 
adding-up restriction for advertising responses, 
namely w, E:JA = 0 for all j  where Etf  is the 
advertising elasticity (defined below). In terms of 
equation (1), the Basmann aggregation condition 
implies that dtj = 0 for all j.
In estimation, one equation is dropped from 
the system to avoid singularity in the regressors. 
Because the adding-up conditions are used to obtain 
coefficients for the deleted equation, adding up is 
treated as a maintained hypothesis in the Rotterdam 
model. In addition, the differentials in equations (1) 
and (2) are approximated by first differences; thus, 
the intercepts must sum to zero, i.e., ai = a , ' 
= 0. Likewise, the coefficients for AGE{ and 
/vl/'7/tmust sum to zero, i.e., e, = e ,' = 0 and 
= -  0. Further, the price coefficients
across equations must sum to zero, i.e., ctJ =
Cjj '=0.  Finally, the coefficients are regarded as 
fixed constants even though they embed budget 
shares, which generally change over time. 
Although these empirical details compromise the 
generality of the Rotterdam specification, the model 
is still regarded as a flexible approximation to an 
unknown true demand system (Barnett; Mountain).
Elasticities from Model A are calculated 
using the expressions:
5Selvanathan's analysis (1989b, p. 218) identifies a weaker 
form of symmetry, namely d,k z dh. The difference arises from a less 
restrictive assumption (than Theil's) about how advertising affects 
marginal utilities.
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(expenditure elasticities)
E j  = b, /w,
(Hicksian price elasticities)
Ey =  C y / W ,
(advertising elasticities)
Eif =dy/wi
(age elasticities)
E,age = e, /w,-
(eating-away-from-home elasticities)
=ft /W(
Elasticities from Model B employ the same 
expressions with the following substitutions: bt = 
b , ' C y = C y ' ,  dy = - Y j C y ' ,  e , = e /  a n d /, = / / .  
Expenditure elasticities are expected to be positive, 
own-price elasticities negative, and the Hicksian 
cross-price elasticities are expected to be positive, 
since beverage products are generally considered to 
be normal goods and substitutes for each other.
Advertising elasticities in general are a 
priori indeterminate (Basmann, p. 53; Green, 
Carman, and McManus, p. 65). However, 
intuitively one would expect own-advertising effects 
to be positive and cross-advertising effects to be 
negative for substitute goods. The age and eating- 
away-from-home elasticities are expected to be 
positive and negative, respectively, for milk. No a 
priori expectations are placed on the age and 
eating-away-from-home coefficients for the 
remaining beverages other than, when combined 
with the estimated coefficients for fluid milk, they 
add up to zero across equations.
Data
The models were estimated with annual 
time-series data covering the period 1970-94.6 
Consumption data for fluid milk, fruit juices, soft
6The sample covers a period of substantial changes in the 
level of soft drink and milk advertising. For example, milk advertising 
in the early 1980s (prior to the implementation of federal legislation 
authorizing the nationwide mandatory check-off ) was about $23 
million per year; by 1994 it had more than tripled to $79 million. Soft 
drink advertising, overthe same period, increased from $250 million per 
yearto $462 million (see Appendix Table 2). No attempt was made in 
this study to determine whether the large increases in expenditures 
affected response coefficients.
drinks, and coffee and tea were obtained from 
Putman and Allshouse, Table 37. Because tea 
consumption is modest (about seven gallons per 
person per year) and has changed little (from a low 
of 6.8 gallons per person in 1970 and 1990 to a 
high of 7.7 gallons in 1976), data for tea and coffee 
were combined. Bottled water consumption, which 
increased from 1.2 gallons per person per year in 
1976 (the first available figure) to 9.2 gallons in 
1993, is not considered in this study because the 
series is incomplete. The included beverages 
account for 92.5 percent of total non-alcoholic 
beverage consumption in 1993.
Price data were obtained primarily from the 
U.S. Department of Labor’s CPI Detailed Report. 
To facilitate the computation of budget shares, the 
CPIs for each beverage were converted to per- 
gallon prices using standard unit conversions. A 
composite price series for coffee and tea was 
obtained by taking the quantity-share weighted 
average of the tea and coffee prices. As a proxy for 
the price of juices, the price of frozen orange-juice 
concentrate was used because orange juice 
represents the major component of the juice 
category. A complete description of the price 
series, along with data sources, is provided in the 
data appendix.
The advertising data were obtained from 
annual issues of AD $ SUMMARY published by 
Leading National Advertisers, Inc. LNA is a 
tracking service agency that estimates the 
advertising expenditures for all brands (including 
industry organizations such as the National Dairy 
Board) that spend at least $25,000 per year in a 
particular medium. The media tracked by LNA 
include network, spot, syndicated, and cable 
television; network and national spot radio; 
magazines (including Sunday supplements); 
newspapers; and outdoor. A complete description 
of the LNA data used in this study is provided in 
the data appendix. The advertising data were 
divided by the CPI for all items (1982-84 = 100) to 
remove the effects of inflation. Sources and 
definitions for the CPI, population, age, and food- 
away-from-home variables are provided in the data 
appendix.
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Estimation Procedure
The models were estimated using seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) to accommodate the 
imposition of the parametric restrictions. 
Simultaneous-equation procedures are not used 
because previous research suggests that price 
endogeneity is relatively unimportant in demand- 
system estimation when the commodities in question 
constitute a small portion of the consumer budget 
(Bronsard and Salvas-Bronsard), as is the case for 
non-alcoholic beverages. Theil’s theory of rational 
random behavior suggests that group expenditure is 
independent of the error term in the Rotterdam 
model. This was confirmed in Brown, Behr, and 
Lee’s analysis.
The adding-up constraint implies that only 
three equations in the system are independent. The 
usual procedure, followed in this study, is to drop 
one equation, estimate the remaining system, and 
calculate the parameters from the omitted equation 
using the classical restrictions. The estimates 
provided in this paper were obtained using the 
systems estimator in Eviews, the Windows version 
of Micro-TSP.
Theoretical restrictions were successively 
imposed and tested using the Wald criterion. Based 
on these tests, an appropriately restricted model 
was used to test for structural change, i.e., whether 
the nonprice variables in equations (1) and (2) 
(including trend) are significant. All tests, unless 
indicated otherwise, use a significance level of 5 
percent. Elasticities are evaluated at mean budget 
shares for 1990-94, the last five years in the 
sample. Due to the first-difference form of the 
Rotterdam model, the first observation is lost and 
the parameter estimates are based on 24 annual 
observations.
Results
Preliminary tests based on the Durbin- 
Watson statistic showed no evidence of serial 
correlation in the unrestricted equations. Wald tests 
indicated that price and advertising homogeneity 
and advertising symmetry are compatible with the 
data, but that price symmetry is not (Table 1).
Similar results were obtained by Goddard and Tielu 
in their study of non-alcoholic beverage advertising 
in the Ontario market, although in their study both 
advertising symmetry and price symmetry were 
rejected. To conserve degrees of freedom and to 
provide a basis for assessing the effects of the 
restriction on the estimated parameters, price 
symmetry is imposed on Model A. The imposition 
of price symmetry, as noted by Goddard and Tielu 
(p. 270), has the further advantage in assuring that 
parameter estimates are consistent with consumer 
theory.
Further testing indicated that trend and 
advertising contribute significantly to the
explanatory power of both models (p < 0.0002, see 
Table 1). AGE and FAEETs contribution, however, 
is marginal. Specifically, AGE, when considered 
separately, is not significant in either model, and 
FAFH is significant in Model B but not Model A. 
However, AGE and FAFH are jointly significant at 
the 6.5 percent level in Model A and at the 0.44 
percent level in Model B and for this reason are 
retained. Theil’s assumption that the
proportionality constant y in Model B is the same 
for all goods is rejected at the 0.02 percent level. 
Based on these tests, the restricted forms selected 
for coefficient estimation are Model A4 and Model 
B1 in Table 1. Model B1 is less restrictive than 
Model A4 in that Model B 1 does not impose price 
symmetry. Thus, a comparison of the parameter 
estimates from A4 and B 1 permits an evaluation of 
the extent to which the classical restrictions affect 
the parameter estimates.
Most of the estimated coefficients have the 
expected signs and are significant (Table 2). The 
Durbin-Watson statistics for the restricted models 
(A4 and B l) are similar to the Durbin-Watson 
statistics for their unrestricted counterparts (Models 
A and B), which suggests that the restrictions do 
not induce specification error. (Recall that price 
symmetry, which is imposed in Model A4, was 
rejected by the Wald test.) The R2s range from 
0.47 for milk to 0.71 for juices in Model A4 and 
from 0.57 for soft drinks to 0.75 for juices in Model 
B l. Thus, between 47 percent and 75 percent of 
the observed year-to-year changes in beverage 
consumption can be “explained” by the models, with
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Table 1. Wald Tests of Model Restrictions
Model Restrictions Computed y2 p-value
A Maintained hypothesis (Equation 1) - —
A1 Price homogeneity (PH) 6.706 0.0819
A2 Price homogeneity and price symmetry (PS) 21.980 0.0012
A3 PH, PS and advertising homogeneity (AH) 4.556 0.2073
A4 PH, PS, AH and advertising symmetry (AS) 7.4091 0.2847
A5 PH, PS, AH, AS and a, = 0, all i 19.944 0.0002
A6 PH, PS, AH, AS and e, = 0, all i 5.262 0.1536
A7 PH, PS, AH, AS and f  = 0, all i 5.472 0.1403
A8 PH, PS, AH, AS and e, = f  = 0, all i 11.867 0.0650
A9 PH, PS, AH, AS and a, = e -= f  = 0, all i 66.094 0,0000
A10 PH, PS, AH, AS and dt] = 0, all i , j 85.802 0.0000
B Maintained hypothesis (Equation 2) - —
B1 PH 0.7075 0.8714
B2 PH and PS 30.424 0.0000
B3 PH and a, = 0, all i 26.351 0.0000
B4 PH and e, = 0, all i 6.106 0.1066
B5 PH and f  = 0, all i 10.751 0.0132
B6 PH and e-t = f  = 0, all i 18.879 0.0044
B7 PH and a; = e{ = f  = 0, all i 100.58 0.0000
B8 PH and y 7= y 2 = y 3 = y 4 = y *0 19.487 0.0002
B9 PH and y ,=  y 7 = y ,  = y 4 = 0 21.917 0.0002
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Table 2. SUR Coefficient Estimates of Non-Alcohol Beverage Demand for Alternative Forms of the Rotterdam Model, 1971-94 Annual data
Equation Price Coefficients Advertising Coefficients Expend. Intercept AGE FAFH
' R2 D.W.
Cil ca Cfl C,4 da da 4 d« ai A
Model A4a
Milk -0.0453
(-4.87)b
0.0009
(1.05)
0.0850
(2.73)
-0.0028
(-3.46)
0.0560
(1.23)
-0.0632
(-2.56)
0.474 2.05
Juices 0.0310
(3.78)
-0.0670
(-2.80)
0.0092
(4.60)
0.0219
(2.36)
0.1909
(2.52)
-0.0016
(-0.78)
0.1197
(1.04)
0.0772
(1.30)
0.709 2.58
Soft Drinks 0.0080
(1.01)
0.0287
(1.63)
-0.0551
(-2.76)
-0.0047
(-1.76)
0.0068
(0.66)
-0.0377
(-2.02)
0.4608
(4.78)
0.0091
(3.42)
-0.0688
(-0.50)
-0.0535
(-0.70)
0.564 2.11
Coffee & Tea 0.0063
(1.39)
0.0073
(0.66)
0.0185
(1.44)
-0.0321
(-2.42)
-0.0054
(-2.16)
-0.0380
(-4.56)
0.0355
(2.67)
0.0078
(0.59)
0.2633
(2.78)
-0.0047
(-1.88)
-0.1077
(-0.81)
0.0395
(0.56)
0.481 2.53
Model Bl°
Milk -0.0145
(-2.28)
0.0229
(3.54)
-0.0112
(-1.97)
0.0028
(1.40)
0.1077
(3.63)
0.0464
(1.72)
-0.0030
(-3.88)
0.0613
(1.67)
-0.0470
(-2.02)
0.586 1.58
Juices -0.0600
(-3.60)
-0.0147
(-1.08)
0.0503
(2.93)
0.0243
(2.99)
-0.6125
(-3.39)
0.3556
(5.06)
-0.0027
(-1.35)
0.1068
(1.08)
0.0620
(1.02)
0.746 1.99
Soft Drinks 0.0263
(1.29)
0.0378
(2.08)
-0.0603
(-2.82)
-0.0037
(-0.53)
-0.7757
(-2.60)
0.3693
(4.03)
0.0102
(3.81)
-0.2422
(-1.93)
-0.0682
(-0.82)
0.566 1.96
Coffee & Tea 0.0481
(2.86)
-0.0460
(-2.87)
0.0212
(1.41)
-0.0234
(-3.13)
1.4950 
(2.59)
0.2286
(2.99)
-0.0046
(-2.22)
0.0742 
(0.72)
0.5329 
(0.83)
0.658 1.89
a Model A4 imposes price homogeneity and symmetry and advertising homogeneity and symmetry on text equation (1); Model B1 imposes price homogeneity on 
text equation (2).
b Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic /-ratios.
a slight edge given to Model B l. However, 
sufficient differences exist between the models to 
suggest that inferences are sensitive to model 
choice, especially with respect to estimated 
advertising effects.
Price Effects
The major difference in the estimated price 
effects between the models pertains to juices. In 
Model A4 the estimated own-price effect for juices 
is significant; in Model Bl it is not. In addition, 
Model Bl indicates that juices and milk are net 
complements, at least when viewed from the 
perspective of juice consumption, whereas Model 
A4 indicates that milk and juices are net substitutes.
Similar results are obtained with respect to 
juices and coffee and tea. In particular, Model A4 
indicates that juices and coffee and tea are 
independent, whereas Model Bl indicates that 
juices and coffee and tea are not independent. The 
conflicting results can be traced to the imposition of 
the price symmetry restriction in Model A4. If 
price symmetry is not imposed (Model Bl), the 
estimated cross-price effects between juices and 
milk and between juices and coffee and tea are 
decidedly asymmetric (compare the estimated 
coefficients c12 and c21 and c24 and c42 for Model Bl 
in Table 2). Imposing the symmetry restriction in 
Model A4 produces a net effect that in the case of 
juices and milk is positive (implying substitutes) 
and in the case of juices and coffee and tea is zero 
(implying independence).
Turning to elasticities, all own-price 
elasticities are similar and plausible (Table 3). 
Model A4's own-price elasticities for milk (-0.161) 
and for juices (-0.426) compare favorably with 
estimates in the literature. Ward and Dixon’s (p. 
735) own-price elasticity estimate for milk is - 
0.153; Brown, Behr and Lee’s (p. 137) estimates 
for individual juice products range from -0.892 for 
grape juice to -1.606 for grapefruit juice.7 The
7That Brown. Behr and Lee’s own-price elasticities are larger 
in absolute value than ours is expected: narrowly defined products have 
more substitutes than the corresponding aggregate. Also, Brown, Behr 
and Lee’s estimates are Marshallion elasticities, which are more elastic 
than their Hicksian counterparts when expenditure effects are positive,
models are consistent in suggesting that the demand 
for soft drinks and coffee and tea is price inelastic. 
Model A4's elasticities for soft drinks and coffee 
and tea are -0.127 and -0.253, respectively; Model 
Bl's corresponding estimates are -0.139 and -0.184. 
The major differences in the models pertain to 
cross-price elasticities. In addition to showing a 
number of complementary relationships, Model 
Bl's cross-effects tend to be more pronounced than 
Model A4's.
Expenditure Effects
Estimated expenditure effects are consistent 
in the two models. That is, total beverage 
expenditure is a significant determinant of the 
demand for milk, juices, soft drinks and coffee and 
tea. Elasticity estimates indicate that milk is the 
least responsive to changes in beverage expenditure 
( 0.165 to 0.302), followed by soft drinks (0.85 to 
1.06). Juices (1.21 to 2.62) and coffee and tea 
(1.80 to 2.07) vie for the most expenditure- 
responsive members of the group. These results are 
consistent with previous findings. Ward and 
Dixon’s estimate of the income elasticity for milk is 
0.293; Brown and Lee’s (1993, p. 431) estimates of 
the expenditure elasticities for citrus products range 
from 0.94 to 1.03
Age, FAFH, and Trend Effects
Among the variables indicating structural 
change, AGE and FAFH have the least influence 
and trend the most. Both models are consistent in 
showing that FAFH's effect is limited to milk. The 
estimated FAFH effect is inelastic (-0.167 to - 
0.225), which suggests that further increases in the 
food-away-from-home/food-at-home expenditure 
ratio will have only a modest depressing effect on 
milk consumption.
The age effect, which is more significant in 
Model Bl than in Model A4, appears to be limited 
to milk and soft drinks. For soft drinks, Model B 1 
provides an AGE elasticity estimate of -0.56. Thus,
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as they are in Brown, Behr and Lee’s study.
Table 3. Hicksian Price Elasticities and Expenditure Elasticities for Non-Alcoholic Beverages, United
States, Evaluated at 1990-94 Mean Data Points
Quantity of: Price of:a Expenditure
Milk Juices Soft Drinks Coffee & Tea
MODEL A4:
Milk -0.1608’ 0.1102“ 0.0284 0.0224 0.3022*
Juices 0.1971* -0.4260* 0.1827 0.0465 1.2140*
Soft Drinks 0.0183 0.0660 -0.1268* 0.0426 1.0600*
Coffee & Tea 0.0498 0.0578 0.1455 -0.2530* 2.0730*
MODEL El:
Milk -0.0515* 0.0813* -0.0398* 0.0010 0.1650
Juices -0.3813* -0.0934 0.3200* 0.1548* 2.2623“
Soft Drinks 0.0605 0.0869* -0.1389* -0.0086 0.8501“
Coffee & Tea 0.3791* -0.3619* 0.1672 -0.1843* 1.8001*
a Asterisk indicates the estimated coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level according to a two-tail t-test. 
Elasticities are evaluated at 1990-94 mean conditional budget shares as follows: w, = 0.2813, w, = 0.1571, w, 
= 0.4344, w4 = 0.1270.
a one-percent increase in the proportion of the U.S. 
population under age five, ceteris paribus, is 
associated with a decline in per-capita soft drink 
consumption of 0.56 percent. The corresponding 
elasticity for milk obtained from Model B1 is 0.22, 
which suggests that milk consumption is less 
sensitive to changes in the age structure than soft- 
drink consumption. It also suggests that recent 
increases in the under-age- five population 
proportion (see Appendix Table 2) will provide a 
modest boost to milk consumption, ceteris paribus. 
Caution, however, is required in interpreting these 
elasticities in that the estimated age effects are 
model sensitive.
Trend effects (the Rotterdam model’s 
intercept) are significant in all equations except 
juices and are robust across the models (Table 2). 
According to Deaton and Muellbauer (p. 70), the 
intercepts can be interpreted as the per annum 
change in the budget share w, that would take place
in the absence of changes in real total expenditure 
and relative prices. Applying this interpretation to 
the estimated values in Table 2, there appears to 
have been a trend increase in the share for soft 
drinks, largely offset by trend decreases in the 
budget shares going to coffee and tea and milk. 
These changes are perhaps the most important and 
obvious shifts in the pattern of U.S. non-alcoholic 
beverage consumption over the past 25 years (see 
Appendix Table 1). The fact that they apparently 
cannot be explained in terms of changes in real 
income, price structure, advertising, and the 
demographic variables suggests that structural 
change is at work. In particular, it appears that 
changes in consumers’ tastes are an important 
contributing factor to the observed consumption 
pattern.
To gauge the relative importance of taste 
change, we computed the following trend 
coefficients:
9
I \™end = (a,./Wl)*100 i = 1, ...,4
where '2l f REm is the per annum percent change in 
quantity where prices, expenditure, advertising, and 
demographics are held constant. The numerical 
values for these trend coefficients based on Model 
A1 using budget shares for 1990-94 are as follows: 
trend = _] 00) ^  trend = _| 02 (insignificant),
%mEND = 2 .10, and = -3.70. According to
these estimates, taste changes alone would be 
associated with a decline in per-capita milk 
consumption of 1 percent per year, an increase in 
per capita soft-drink consumption of 2.1 percent 
per year, and a decline in per-capita coffee and tea 
consumption of 3.7 percent per year. A comparison 
of the actual and predicted changes based on taste 
change for 1990-94 is as follows:
Predicted Actual Ratio
milk -4.98% -3.89% 1.28
soft drinks 10.47% 12.74% 0.82
coffee & tea -18.50% -15.61% 1.18
As can be seen, for the commodities with a 
significant trend, all but 18-28 percent of the 
observed consumption change can be explained by 
changes in taste. Stated another way, economic 
variables (including advertising) appear to account 
for at most 28 percent of the observed consumption 
pattern between 1990 and 1994. The finding that 
taste change accounts for a large portion of the 
observed consumption pattern reinforces inferences 
based on the statistical tests (see Table 1, 
restrictions A5 and B3), which suggest that trend 
cannot be deleted from the demand system without 
causing serious specification error.
Advertising Effects
The robustness issue is most pronounced in 
the advertising effects. For example, using a 7-ratio 
of 1.65 to indicate significance — the cut-off for a 
two-tail test at the 10 percent level — two of the 
estimated own-advertising effects that are 
significant in Model B 1 (milk and coffee and tea) 
are not significant in Model A4. (Significance in 
Model B1 is determined by testing whether the
compound term y } c f  is zero — see Table 4, note 
a.) Moreover, the own-effect for juice advertising, 
which is significant in Model A4, is insignificant in 
Model Bl.
The only consistency between the two 
models in the estimation of own-advertising effects 
is for soft drinks. In this case, however, the own­
advertising effect is negative. One interpretation of 
this result is that satiation effects are at work. Soft- 
drink advertising at $462 million in 1994 was five 
times milk advertising and nearly double the level 
of juice advertising and coffee and tea advertising 
(Appendix Table 2). A negative own-advertising 
effect for soft-drinks was also obtained by Goddard 
and Tielu8
Turning to the cross-advertising effects, 
both models are consistent in showing that milk 
advertising has no effect on soft-drink demand and 
negatively affects coffee and tea demand (Table 4, 
column). Also, both models are consistent in 
showing that soft-drink advertising has no effect on 
milk demand (Table 4, row). Similar results were 
obtained by Goddard and Tielu with respect to the 
Ontario market. Specifically, soft drink and juice 
advertising were found to have little effect on milk 
demand, while milk advertising had a relatively 
large effect on juice demand (Goddard and Tielu, p. 
273). However, in our results the models are 
inconsistent in indicating how milk advertising 
affects juice demand. In particular, Model A4 
indicates that milk advertising has a positive effect 
on juice demand whereas Model B 1 indicates that 
the effect is negative.
“The Almost Ideal Demand System and double- log models 
estimated in preliminary analysis also produced a negative and 
statistically significant own-advertising effect for soft drinks. Thus, the 
result is robust to functional form. That satiation effects may be at work 
receives support from a study by Clarke (1973) in which he found that 
advertising competition had forced a number of brands to increase 
advertising expenditures "...passed the point of diminishing returns" (p. 
259). In fact, by the end of the study period, nine of the 18 brands were 
overspending, including five of the six largest brands. The intensity of 
advertising competition that encourages the overspending was 
demonstrated by Clarke (1973, p. 258) with the following example: 
“A ll  is the largest selling brand in the industry, but if A11 increased 
advertising by lpercent, its two major competitors could cut A ll's 
expected sales increase (sic) from an 8.4 percent gain to only a 4.94 
percent gain by increasing their own advertising 1 percent! (sic)" This 
may explain the "cola wars" and the consequent overspending implied by 
our estimates.
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The Proportionality Hypothesis
Given the conflicting results produced by 
the two models, especially with respect to 
advertising effects, the question arises whether they 
are statistically equivalent. To test this, we formed 
the hypothesis:
(3a) Hn : dy = - y, cy
For all / and j
(3b) Ha : Hn not true
where Cy and dtj are the price and advertising 
coefficients, respectively, in equation (1), and y } 
are the proportionality coefficients in equation (2). 
Hypothesis (3 a) is Theil’s proportionality 
hypothesis. When the restriction is true, equation 
(1) reduces to equation (2). Thus, to determine 
whether models A4 and B1 are equivalent, it is 
sufficient to test hypothesis (3).
The tests were conducted using a Wald 
statistic as indicated in Table 5. Because Model B 1 
does not impose price symmetry and Model A4 
does, we also tested less restrictive forms of the two 
models. Specifically, to remove the effect of price 
symmetry, we tested Model B1 against Model A1. 
In yet a third test, we contrasted Model B against 
Model A, perhaps the purest test in that none of the 
classical restrictions is imposed on either model.
Results from all three tests indicate 
decisive rejection of the proportionality hypothesis 
(p < 0.0000). That is, Theil’s hypothesis that 
advertising elasticities are proportional to price 
elasticities is not supported by our data. This is 
true notwithstanding the latitude given the 
hypothesis in our model; namely, that the 
proportionality factor y  be permitted to vary across 
goods. (Recall that Theil posited that the y - s are 
the same for all goods.) Thus, the two models are 
not statistically equivalent, which implies that the 
parameter estimates from the Theil specification 
(Model B l) should be treated with caution.
Spillover Effects
A critical issue from the standpoint of 
advertising benefit-cost analysis is spillover, i.e., 
whether one commodity’s advertising affects the 
demand for related goods. Returning to the cross­
advertising elasticities in Table 4, and focusing on 
Model A4, fully two-thirds of the estimated cross­
effects are significant at the 5 percent level or 
lower. Morever, among the significant cross­
elasticities, most are larger in absolute value than 
the corresponding own-advertising elasticities. For 
example, the cross-elasticities of milk advertising 
with respect to juice demand (0.059) and coffee and 
tea demand (-0.043) are at least 13 times larger in 
absolute value than milk’s own-advertising 
elasticity (0.003), which is not significant at usual 
probability levels.
The foregoing elasticity estimates suggest 
that milk advertising may be more effective at 
altering the demand for related beverages than at 
increasing its own demand, a result consistent with 
Goddard and Teilu’s findings. Specifically, 
Goddard and Tielu’s (p. 273) cross-elasticities of 
milk advertising with respect to tomato 
(0.086),orange (-0.100), and apple (-0.037) juice 
demand are at least nine times larger in absolute 
value than the own-advertising elasticity for milk 
(0.004). Similar results obtain both in our study 
and in Goddard and Tielu’s for juice and soft drink 
advertising, although the ratios of cross-effects to 
own-effects are not as pronounced as for milk.
Concluding Comments
Results presented in this paper support 
Galbraith’s hypothesis. Specifically, the hypothesis 
that advertising has no effect on the aggregate 
demand for specific items within the non-alcoholic 
beverage groups is rejected decisively. However, 
the estimated direct effects of advertising are 
modest and, with the exception of soft drinks, 
fragile. For example, the estimated own-advertising 
elasticity for milk ranges from a statistically 
insignificant 0.0032 in the simple-shift version of 
the Rotterdam model to 0.0055 in the taste-shift 
specification. Although the latter estimate is 
statistically significant, it is so tiny as to suggest
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Table 4. Advertising and Demographic Elasticities for Non-Alcoholic Beverages, United States, Evaluated 
at 1990-94 Mean Data Points
Quantity of: Advertising of: AGE FA EH
Milk Juices Soft Drinks Coffee & 
Tea
MODEL A4:
Milk 0.0032 0.0327’ -0.0167 -0.0192’ 0.1989 -0.2245’
Juices 0.0585’ 0.1394’ 0.0433 -0.2419’ 0.7612 0.4913
Soft Drinks -0.0108 0.0158 -0.0868’ 0.0817’ -0.1564 -0.1232
Coffee & Tea -0.0426’ -0.2991’ 0.2798’ 0.0618 -0.8479 0.3109
MODEL Rl:
Milk 0.0055“ -0.0088“ 0.0043 -0.0011 0.2179 -0.1673’
Juices -0.2336“ -0.0572 0.1960“ 0.0948“ 0.6790 0.3943
Soft Drinks 0.0470 0.0674 -0.1077“ -0.0067 -0.5575 -0.1570
Coffee & Tea -0.5668“ 0.5411 -0.2499 0.2756“ 0.5841 0.4196
a Single asterisk indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level according to a two-tail 
f-test. Double asterisk indicates the estimated coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level according to a Wald 
test of the non-linear restriction y j cy' =0 . Elasticities are evaluated at 1990-94 mean conditional budget 
shares as follows: w, = 0.2813, w2 = 0.1571, w3 = 0.4344, w4 = 0.1270.
Table 5. Wald Tests of the Proportionality Hypothesis
Model Comparison Computed x2 Probability Result
A vs. B 93.143 0.000000 Reject Model B
A1 vs. B1 80.759 0.000000 Reject Model B1
A4 vs. B1 42.614 0.000000 Reject Model B 1
Note: Model B and its variants contain the proportionality hypothesis. Tests are conducted for Yi = 0.1077, y2 
= -0.6125, y3 = -0.7757, and y4 = 1.4950, the point estimates given in Table 2.
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that even with the large spending increases 
associated with the recent (post-1994) fluid milk 
processor initiative, there is little to expect in the 
way of changes in per-capita milk consumption.9 
Similar inferences apply to juice advertising, 
although the own-advertising elasticity estimate 
from the statistically superior simple-shift 
specification (0.1394) is large enough in a relative 
sense to suggest that changes in juice advertising 
might have important effects on the consumption 
pattern.
Theil’s hypothesis that advertising effects 
are proportional to price effects is rejected by our 
data. Given the importance of the hypothesis in 
simulation work (Wohlgenant), model specification 
(Green, Carman and McManus), and estimation 
(Duffy 1987, 1990; Selvanthanan 1989a; Brown 
and Lee 1993), further testing is warranted. 
Specifically, it would be useful to test the 
hypothesis on a wider array of goods and with 
other data sets and models to establish robustness. 
Clearly, given its elegance and usefulness, it would 
be imprudent to abandon the proportionality 
hypothesis on the basis of a single test.
The dominant pattern in U.S. non­
alcoholic beverage consumption over the past 25 
years has been a steady increase in per-capita soft- 
drink consumption, largely at the expense of coffee 
consumption and, to a lesser extent, milk 
consumption. Although changes in relative prices, 
real beverage expenditures, and advertising have 
influenced this pattern, our results suggest that the 
major factor responsible for the observed 
consumption pattern is structural change. The
9Tliis is not to say that the fluid milk processor initiative is 
necessarily unprofitable. Given the size of the U.S. fluid milk market 
($15.2 billion at retail in 1994) relative to the processor advertising 
investment ($114 million per year), it does not take much of a demand 
increase to yield a favorable benefit-cost ratio, especially if fluid milk 
supplies are relatively price inelastic. And in light of the positive 
spillover effect of milk advertising onto the juice market indicated in 
Table 4 (Model A4), it is possible that the total elasticity for milk 
advertising is positive, even if the partial elasticity is zero. A total 
elasticity for milk advertising in principle could be calculated using 
procedures described by Piggott, Piggott, and Wright or by Kinnucan 
(1997) (see also Kinnucan and Belleza). However, that would entail 
specifying a complete structural model of the U.S. non-alcoholic 
beverage market, including linkages between market levels, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
basis for this claim is that the trend coeffecient in 
each of the estimated equations except juice is 
significant and numerically large. Specifically, per 
annum changes in per-capita consumption related 
strictly to trend are estimated at -1.0 percent for 
milk, 2.1 percent for soft drinks, and -3.7 percent 
for coffee and tea. Applying these coefficients to 
the observed consumption pattern for the most 
recent five years of our sample (1990-94) we find 
that fully 80 percent of the observed change can be 
explained by trend (taste change), leaving only 20 
percent to be accounted for by economic variables, 
including advertising. The effects of demographic 
variables, namely the aging of the U.S. population 
and the increased incidence of meals taken away 
from home, appear to be confined to milk, and to be 
less important than taste change in explaining the 
observed consumption pattern.
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Data Appendix
Retail price series were developed in a three 
step-procedure. First, the U.S. city average price of 
each beverage in December 1995 was obtained from 
the CPI Detailed Report. These prices were then 
divided by each beverage’s CPI for December 1995 
(1982-84 = 100) to obtain an average price for the 
1982-84 base period. The base-period prices were 
then multiplied by each beverage’s annual CPI 
(1982-84 = 100) to form the price series. Because 
the CPI Detailed Report does not list a price for tea, 
a modified version of the foregoing procedure had to 
be used for tea. In addition, unit conversions and 
other complications arose with the other beverages. 
Details are provided below.
Fluid milk price: The fluid milk price was proxied 
as a simple average of whole and low-fat milk 
prices. The December 1995 U.S. city average price 
for fresh, whole, fortified milk is $2.518 per gallon; 
the corresponding price for fresh, low-fat milk is 
$2.310 per gallon. Applying the foregoing procedure
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to the simple average of these two prices yields a 
base-period price of $1,806 per gallon.
Fruit juice price: The price of frozen orange-juice 
concentrate was taken as a proxy for fruit-juice 
price. The December 1995 U.S. city average price 
of frozen orange-juice concentrate was $ 1.573 per 
16 oz. (473 ml). Since one gallon equals 3,800 ml, 
a gallon of concentrate cost $12,637. Assuming 
that concentrate is mixed with water in a 3:1 ratio 
(one part concentrate to 3 parts water), this implies 
a December 1995 price of $4,212 per gallon 
drinking juice. Applying the foregoing procedure to 
this price yields a base-period price of $3,080 per 
gallon.
Soft drink price : The price of regular cola in two 
liter containers was taken as a proxy for the price 
of soft drinks. The December 1995 U.S. city 
average price of regular cola was $0,996. Using 
the conversion 3.8 liters equals one gallon, this 
translates into a December 1995 cola price of 
$1,892 per gallon. Applying the foregoing 
procedure to this price yields a base-period price 
for soft drinks of $ 1.597 per gallon.
Coffee price: The price of coffee was measured as 
the simple average of instant and ground roast 
coffee price. The December 1995 U.S. city 
average price of instant coffee is $10,299 per 
pound. Each pound of instant makes 
approximately 186.8 cups of 6.0 oz. fluid coffee or 
8.759 gallons. So the December 1995 price of 
instant coffee is $1.176 per gallon drinking coffee.
The December 1995 U.S city average price of 
ground roast coffee is $3,507 per pound. Ground 
roast coffee makes approximately 59.8 cups of 6.0 
oz. fluid coffee, or 2.803 gallons. So the 
December 1995 price of ground roast coffee is 
$1,251 per gallon drinking coffee. Applying the 
foregoing procedure to the simple average of the 
instant and ground-roast prices yields a base- 
period price for coffee of $0,777 per gallon.
Tea price: The tea price series was complicated 
by the fact that the CPI Detail Report does not list 
a price for tea and ceased publishing a price index 
for tea in 1977. The latter problem was solved by 
constructing a price index (1982 = 100) for the 
period 1975-95 based on data in Tropical 
Products: World Markets and Trade (pp. 36-37)
provided by the International Tea Committee (ITC). 
This index was spliced to the USDL’s tea index to 
obtain an index for the entire sample period 1970­
94. To convert the index to actual prices, the price 
of tea in 1978 was obtained from ITC data 
published in Estimated United States Average 
Retail Price o f Food, which lists an average price 
for tea in 1978 of $1,235 for tea bags, 40-bag 
package. Assuming that each tea bag produces 
approximately 7.2 oz. of tea, this translates into 
2.242 gallons of liquid tea per package, or a 1978 
price of $0.551 per gallon. Dividing this price by 
the CPI for tea in 1978 (1982 = 100) provides an 
estimate of the base-period price. Multiplying the 
base-period price by the annual CPI for tea (1982 = 
100) provided the tea price series.
The composite price series for coffee and 
tea was constructed as a quantity-share weighted 
average of the foregoing tea and coffee prices. The 
price and quantity series used in this study are given 
in Appendix Table 1. The advertising series and 
related data are given in Appendix Table 2. Basic 
data sources for the nonprice series and special 
notes are as follows:
q} to : The source for the quantity data is Putman 
and Allshouse, Table 37.
p } to p r The basic data source for the price series 
was the U. S. Department of Labor’s CPI Detailed 
Report, Table P4, pp. 234-35, which reports 
average retail food prices for U.S. cities and four 
regions. This source, however, does not list a price 
for tea. The sources and methods used to obtain a 
tea price series are provided in the appendix 
narrative.
a] to a ,: The basic source for the advertising data is 
AD $ SUMMARY published by Leading National 
Advertisers, Inc., New York City. The relevant 
LNA categories are as follows: F131 (milk, butter, 
eggs), F171(coffee, tea, and cocoa), F I72 (fruit 
drinks), F221 (regular soft drinks), F222 (diet soft 
drinks), F223 (non-carbonated soft drinks). 
Because of definitional changes and aggregation, 
several adjustments had to be made before these 
data could be used for analysis. First, in 1984 LNA 
broadened the juice category (FI72) to include 
powdered drinks, which was formerly in the F223 
category. At the same time, LNA added a new
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category (F224), bottled water, which was 
formerly in F223. Since it was not possible to 
isolate the proportion of F 172 expenditures that is 
strictly juice advertising in the redefined series, it 
was decided that the best approach was simply to 
add the three categories. That is, in our study, 
fruit-juice advertising is measured as 
F172+F223+F224.
The second adjustment has to do with the 
F131 category. This category includes 
expenditures for butter and eggs as well as fluid 
milk. To isolate the milk expenditures, we 
collected data for F131 “brands” as follows: 
National Dairy Board, California Milk Advisory 
Board, American Dairy Association, United Dairy 
Industry Association, Mid-Atlantic Farmers’ Milk, 
Dairymans’ Dairy Products, and Cow Dairyman 
Association. Thus, the data for fluid milk 
advertising used in this study refer strictly to 
generic advertising expenditures as reported by 
LNA. (The series excludes expenditures by the 
newly-formed Fluid Milk Processors’ Board as that 
campaign commenced in 1995, a year later than 
our sample period.)
The third adjustment has to do with 
missing values. Data prior to 1974 for juices, soft 
drinks and coffee and tea were unavailable. For 
milk, no data were available for 1974 and 1975. 
The latter two data points were obtained by 
interpolation. For the other beverages, the missing 
values were “backcast” from the regression 
equation ADit = a  + (W + y t2 + et where ADit is 
the total advertising expenditure for good i in 
period t as reported by LNA, and t is a trend 
variable that assumes the values 5,6,..., 10 for 
1974-83. The regressions were run on the 
combined juice series F172+F223+F224, the 
combined soft-drink series F221+F222, and the 
single series F 171 for coffee and tea. The missing 
values for 1970-73 were computed from the 
estimated regressions by setting t = 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively, and computing AD„ when the 
residuals are zero.
AGE: The proportion of the U.S. population less 
than age five was obtained from Table B-30 in 
Economic Report to the President, p. 315.
FAFH\ This is expenditures on food-away-from-
home divided by expenditures on food-at-home. 
Data source is Putman and Allshouse, Table 98, p. 
136.
POP: Resident U.S. population on July 1. Source: 
Putman and Allshouse, Table 115.
CPE: Consumer Price Index for all items for all 
urban consumers. Source: Putman and Allshouse, 
Table 101.
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Appendix Table 1. Quantity and Retail Price Data for Non-alcoholic Beverages, United States, 
1970-94
YEAR
1
9 i
<
<h
Gallons/p'
$3 $4 P\
(
Pi Pi P a
\\ - ■ " —  j ---------- ;
1970 31.3 5.7 24.3 40.2 0.904 1.291 0.609 0.250
1971 31.3 5.7 25.5 40.4 0.928 1.341 0.644 0.258
1972 31.0 6.2 26.2 40.9 0.942 1.434 0.656 0.255
1973 30.5 6.0 27.6 40.7 1.031 1.445 0.674 0.279
1974 29.5 6.0 27.6 40.7 1.235 1.497 0.834 0.327
1975 29.5 6.6 28.2 38.9 1.236 1.616 1.026 0.358
1976 29.3 6.9 30.8 40.2 1.301 1.655 0.994 0.475
1977 29.0 7.0 33.0 32.0 1.314 1.993 1.041 0.830
1978 28.6 6.4 34.2 34.5 1.390 2.114 1.131 0.774
1979 28.2 6.8 34.7 36.2 1.551 2.311 1.234 0.744
1980 27.6 7.2 35.1 34.0 1.688 2.473 1.383 0.801
1981 27.1 7.4 35.4 33.2 1.783 2.833 1.522 0.696
1982 26.4 6.8 35.3 32.8 1.793 2.965 1.562 0.707
1983 26.3 8.4 35.2 33.3 1.805 2.973 1.602 0.729
1984 26.4 7.3 35.9 3.3.9 1.819 3.248 1.626 0.813
1985 26.7 7.7 35.7 34.5 1.847 3.412 1.642 0.754
1986 26.5 7.9 35.8 34.6 1.836 3.239 1.654 0.919
1987 26.3 8.2 41.9 33.6 1.871 3.377 1.688 0.806
1988 25.8 8.2 44.7 32.6 1.914 3.788 1.688 0.799
1989 26.0 7.7 45.4 33.0 2.064 3.905 1.731 0.847
1990 25.7 6.9 46.3 33.6 2.288 4.313 1.790 0.833
1991 25.7 7.9 47.9 33.6 2.210 4.080 1.805 0.809
1992 25.4 7.3 48.5 32.9 2.282 4.270 1.835 0.785
1993 24.9 8.4 50.2 30.5 2.309 4.040 1.851 0.765
1994 24.7 8.6 52.2 28.1 2.369 4.059 1.848 0.934
Note: The subscripts are defined as follows: 1 = fluid milk, 2 = juices, 3 = soft drinks, and 4 = coffee and tea. 
See appendix narrative for sources and explanatory notes.
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Appendix Table 2. Advertising and Remaining Data Used to Estimate the Non-alcoholic 
Beverage Demand System, United States, 1970-94
YEAR A A 2 A3 A 4
_ .
AGE
(%)
FAFH
(Ratio)
POP
(Thous.)
CPI
)
1970 1.903 9.308 24.173 19.711 8.372 0.356 203984 0.388
1971 4.246 21.117 48.346 39.422 8.304 0.360 206827 0.405
1972 11.346 32.924 72.519 59.133 8.147 0.371 209284 0.418
1973 12.101 44.732 96.692 78.844 7.952 0.375 211357 0.444
1974 12.853 31.332 97.004 73.857 7.709 0.365 213342 0.493
1975 13.691 49.711 108.654 89.378 7.464 0.398 215465 0.538
1976 14.529 77.690 135.078 116.005 7.163 0.427 217563 0.569
1977 16.239 83.426 134.631 109.883 7.067 0.444 219760 0.606
1978 15.948 110.466 179.964 167.732 7.069 0.465 222095 0.652
1979 19.144 122.060 237.990 211.525 7.137 0.474 224567 0.726
1980 22.256 120.370 252.695 226.367 7.224 0.476 227225 0.824
1981 22.747 139.172 238.063 226.148 7.346 0.502 229466 0.909
1982 25.643 115.962 257.707 237.892 7.420 0.527 231664 0.965
1983 27.302 148.523 321.234 214.831 7.489 0.546 233792 0.996
1984 4.956 195.280 362.288 244.390 7.487 0.555 235825 1.039
1985 23.056 187.830 384.472 239.620 7.482 0.561 237924 1.076
1986 55.795 186.050 392.375 231.370 7.464 0.578 240133 1.096
1987 54.969 211.660 389.182 215.830 7.435 0.595 242289 1.136
1988 54.844 229.300 457.548 282.690 7.426 0.608 244499 1.183
1989 59.867 246.159 428.224 317.255 7.483 0.599 246819 1.240
1990 28.369 262.460 497.875 340.450 7.542 0.591 249402 1.307
1991 31.653 239.874 477.846 264.986 7.599 0.589 252131 1.362
1992 28.882 228.528 470.847 253.787 7.637 0.615 255028 1.403
1993 72.954 224.990 434.422 260.885 7.627 0.649 257783 1.445
1994 78.969 266.681 462.122 280.454 7.571 0.666 260341 1.482
Note: The subscripts are defined as follows: 1 = fluid milk, 2 = juices, 3 = soft drinks, and 4 = coffee and 
tea. See appendix narrative for sources and explanatory notes.
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